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In 
The Supreme Gourt 
of the 
State of Utah 
GERTRUDE ERICKSON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
VB. 
G. A. BASTIAN AND 
ROEAN BAST~"N", 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Appeal From Sixth Judicial District. 
Wayne County , 
Honorable Henry D. Haye-s, Judge 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEI\fENT OF FACTS 
Thi·s action was commenced to recover judg-
ment and decree declaring the defendants to be in 
default in the performance of the terms of an 
agreement for the purchase of a farm, farm machin-
ery and other personal property purchased by the 
defendants from the plaintiff and for the recovery 
of the posses·sion of the property covered by the 
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contract. There was a judgment for the defend-
ants. The court decreed that because of certain 
alleged conversations prior to and at the time the 
contract was entered into, the plaintiff had waived 
her right to .repo·ssession. 
The testimony and findings of the court show 
that an agreement was entered into on August 25: 
1938, by which the plaintiff agreed to sell and the 
defendants agreed to purchase 100 acres of agri-
cultural land's situated in Loa, Utah, together with 
64 shares of water in the Fremont Irrig:ation Com-
pany, a new; modern five room home, and certain 
personal property consisting of livestock, farming 
implements, household furniture and , other per-
sonal property. A copy of thrs agreement is a~ 
follows: (Tr. 1-5; Ab. 31-32, 14). 
AGREEMENT 
This agreement, made and entered into by and 
between Gertrude B·. Erickson, of Loa, Utah, party 
of the first part, and G. A. Bastian and Roean 
Bastian, his wife, of Loa, Utah, parties of the sec-
ond part, WITNESSETH : 
That party of the first part agrees to sell and 
J.;·arties of the second pa;rt agree to buy the follow-
ing de·scribed real estate: 
Lot 1 (NE% NE1t)JJ of Section 1, Twp. 28 
South, Range 2 East, containing 40 acres: 
also commencing 0 rod East of S'W cor-
ner Lot 4, Section 31, to 27 South, Range 
3 East, thence North 48 rods, East 71 rods, 
South 48 rods ; west 71 rod\s to beginning,J 
containing 21 acres; also Lot 4 of Section 
6, Twp. 28 South, Range 3 East, S. L. M., 
containing 36.53 acres, together with all 
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improvements thereon, and all water 
rights thereunto pertaining, consisting of 
64 shares in the Fremont Irrigation Com-
pany, 1 water tap in the Loa Water Work~ 
Co.; 1 light attachment in the Peoples 
Light & Power Co., also all farm imple-
ments and machinery, 1 team and harness, 
4 cows, 6 brood sow"s and 10 small pigs, 
also all floor coverings and 1 heatrola, by 
consent of both parties 
for the sum of $14,000.00, payable as follows: 
$2,000.00 more or less payable on or before Feb-
ruary 1, 1939, and $1,000.00 each year payable on 
February 1 of each year until the entire sum is, 
paid, together with interest at the rate of 4 percent 
per annum payable annually at the time the prin-
clpal is paid; 
It is understood that this land ·above described 
is mortgaged to the California-Western States. 
Life Insurance Company, and it is understood be-
tween both parties that whatever the amount of 
this mortgage i's, the parties of second part agree 
to assume and pay and the amount so paid shall be 
deducted from the purchase price of $14,000.00 and 
the balance shall be payable to party of the first 
part as above outlined. 
The partie·s of the second part are entitled to 
all the crop on said land just as it stands this day, 
~nd they are aHowed to take posses·sion on this date 
of the land, improvements and water rights. 
The parties of the second part agree that no 
water, land or improvements shall be di·sposed of 
by them until this contract is paid in full. 
The parties of the second part shall be allowed 
30 days grace in making the above payments, in 
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the event that their lamb crop or other crops can-
not be disposed of by February 1 of each year. 
The parties of the second part agree to pay 
all taxes and assessments against said land ana 
water commencing with the year 1938. 
In the event that the parties of the second part 
shall default in the payment of either principal or 
interest a·s above outlined, the first party shall 
have the right to re-enter and take peaceable pos-
session of said land and improvements, and of thi:::~ 
agreement and the warranty deed and all other 
papers pertaining to this agreement. 
This agreement and the warranty deed sh::1ll 
be held in escrow in the Clerk '·s Office, inasmuch 
as it is understood that the abstract of title and 
water certificate are now held by the California 
Western States Life Insurance Company. 
It is understood that there is a second mort-
gage to State Bank of Wayne on said land and 
water, which parties of second :part agree to com~ 
plete the payment of, and the amount so paid shall 
be deducted from the first $2,000.00 payment to 
party of the first part, payment to bank to be made 
out of the 1938 crop on land. 
GERTRUDE ERICKSON, 
Party of the First Part 
G. A. BASTIAN, 
ROEAN BASTIAN, 
Parties of the Second Part 
All of the personal property, together with the 
possession of the real estate, and growing· and har-
vested crops were delivered by the plaintiff to the 
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defendants on the date of the contract. (Tr. 10-12; 
Ab. 34, 17). At the time the po·ssession of the. 
property was delivered there were large and boun-
teorrs crops gTowing· thereon, consisting of alfalfa 
hay, grain and potatoes. The market value of the 
crops harvested and gro·wing was approximately 
$1500. The reasonable rental value of the home 
on the premises wa·s $25.00 per month. (Tr. 14-15; 
Ab. 36, 17). The plaintiff also delivered to the de-
fendants one water tap share in the Loa Wa,ter 
Works Company which entitled the defendants to 
receive culinary water, also one light attachment 
in the Beople '·s Light & Power Company, which 
entitled the defendants to the use of light and 
rower. The farm equipment consisted of .a nev{ 
mower, a new rake~ a disc harrow, two-way plough, 
a hand plough, a Utah lay-off, a new manure 
spreader, a rubber tired wagon, various extras for 
farm machinery, a large number of logs and shed 
posts, a large pile of fire wood, a team of horses and 
harness, three cows, five brood sows and eighteen 
small pigs, atso certain fixtures and furniture in 
the home. (A b. 18). 
Ever since the date of the contract the defend-
,ants have had the use of all of the real and per-
Ronal property; have used and occupied the home 
thereon and received and applied to their own uses 
all of the crops g-rown on the property in 1938 :and 
1939 (Ab. 18). The defendants paid nothing 'to 
the plaintiff at the time the property was delivered. 
(Ab. 17). 
It was ·stipulated between the parties that the 
contract attached to the complaint, Exhibit A, is 
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6 
a true copy of the contract between the parties; 
that the notice attached to the supplemental com-
plaint and marked Exhibit B is a true copy ·of the 
notice served on Mr. and Mrs. Bastian on the 6th 
day of March, 1939, that Exhibit C attached to 
plaintiff '·s complaint is a true copy of the notice 
served on Mr. and Mrs. Bastian on the 6th day of 
April, 1939, and Exhibit D is a true copy of the 
·original order discharging the garnishee in the case 
of J. S. Peterson v. Gertrude Erickson and waH 
served on the defendants on April 6, 1939; that no 
payments were made by either of the defendants 
to Mrs. Erickson except the payment of $900.00 
shown by the bank receipts, Exhibit B. (Tr. 4-6; 
Ab. 32). 
By the terms of the agreement the defendants 
were to pay for the property $14,000.00 a~ follows: 
$2,000.00 more or less on or before February 1, 
1939, and $1,000.00 payable on February 1 of each 
year until the entire sum i·s paid, together with in-
terest at the rate of 4 percent per annum, payable 
annually at the time the principal is paid. The de-
fendants also agreed to pay all taxes and aS'sess-
ments against the land and water commencing with 
the year 1938. The contract also cont~ined the fol-
lowing provi·sion: 
''In the event that the parties of the second 
part shall default in the payment of either 
principal or interest as above outlined, the 
first party shall have the right to re-enter 
and take peaceable pos·session of said land 
and improvements, and of this agreement 
and the warranty deed and all other papers 
pertaining to this agreement.'' 
The agreement was·· prepared by Elsie Eckersley, 
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clerk of the Di·strict Court of \Y ayne County, and 
the agreen1ent, together with the warranty deed to 
the pren1i~es was deposited with Mrs. Eckersley as 
escrow holder. (Tr. 2; Ab. 31, 18). 
All of the foregoing facts are undisputed and 
the court found on undisputed testimony that the 
defendants have not paid the plaintiff the $2,000.00 
payable on February 1, 1939, except this, that the. 
defendants paid to the State Bank of Wayne ap-
proximately the sum of_ $900.00 to which they were 
entitled to credit upon the $2,000.00 payment. The 
fact is undi·sputed that the defendants did not pay 
the interest or any part thereof upon the principal 
sum of $14,000.00, and failed and neglected to pay 
the taxes for the year 1938. The contract providea 
that the defendants should be allowed 30 days 
grace in making the payment of $2,000.00 in the 
event their lamb crop or other crops had not been 
di·sposed of by February 1 of each year. (Ab. 16). 
The court found that on !Yiarch 6, 1939, the plain-
tiff served upon each of the defendants, personally, 
a notice of their default and a demand for the sur-
render of the premises. This fact is undi·sputed. 
Plaintiff, in her complaint in addition to claiming 
her right to the possession of the prope.rty for The 
defendants' default, also asked for damages and 
for the appointment of --a receiver. It was assumed 
at the time the complaint was filed that the de-
fendants might fail properly to care for the prop-
erty, and would take the croP's for 1939 unless the 
ca·se could be reached for trial before that time, and 
'for thesP reasons it seemed expedient to ask for a 
rEceiver. 
At the time of trial the plaintiff did not at-
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tempt to prove the damage alleged in her supple. 
mental complaint and prior thereto waived her 
application for the appointment of a receiver on 
the assurance of an early trial. The defendants' 
answer claimed performance according to the 
terms of the agreement. No affirmative defense 
was made on the ground of any modification of 
the agreement, but it was contended tthat because of 
the us~ of the words "more or less" following the 
provision for the paxment of $2',000.000, there was 
no obligation to pay that sum or any other sum 
except ·such amount as might be realized from the 
~feeding of lambs on the farm during the fall and 
winter of 19B8. 
The court made findings upon all facts essen-
tially as claimed by the plaintiff with the excep-
tion of the occurrences at the time of the nego-
tiations and the conversations of the parties. at the 
time the eontract was prepared and signed. The 
findings, conclusions, and decree (Tr. 32'; Ab_ 29) 
will hereafter be discus·sed more fully with respect 
to these controverted matters. The court fir~t 
came to the conclusion that because of these occur-
rence's and conversations the plaintiff was not en-
titled to the $2,000.00 payment and had waived her 
right to repossess. 'rhe court subsequently modj-
fied its decision re'storing the $2,000.00 payable on 
February 1, 1939, but fixed the time of payment 
as of February 1, 1940, and decreed that the de-
fendants had fully performed all the terms and con. 
ditions of the contract; that plaintiff had waived 
her right to reposse·ss, and ordered plaintiff's case 
dismiRsed. (Tr. 124-125). 
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ARGU~IENT 
Appellant has as·signed five errors. Assign-
ment No. 1, that the court erred in making1 its find ... 
ing of fact No. 9 wherein the court finds that at the 
time of the execution of the agreement there was an 
understanding· that if defendants would feed lambs 
upon the property, the plaintiff would look to the 
net proceeds from the sale of lambs for the first 
•payment on said contract to be paid February 1, 
1939, and would look to the net proceeds from the 
sale of said lambs for the payment of interest at 
the rate of 4 percent per annum upon the sum of 
$14,000, and erred in finding that for the payment 
due on February 1, 1939, the plaintiff assumed the 
whole rrsk that the lamb proceeds would pay the 
:uuoWit of $2,000.00 and interest and that if the 
profits from the feeding of lambs were insufficient 
to pay said sum and interest7 the plaintiff would 
waive her right to re-enter and take possession of 
the property ; 
1,hat the court erred in finding No. 10 wherein the· 
court finds that the plaintiff knew the defendants 
'had nothing and would have to rely upon the pro-
ceeds of the farm and lamb erop for payment upon 
the contract, and that plaintiff was willing: to an-d 
tiid assume every risk incident to placing all of th~ 
property including the growing crop in the hands 
of the defendants and assumed each and every ri'ok 
incident to the feeding of lambs and whether there 
would be any profits arising therefrom; and that 
the parties in .the use of the words ''more or les·s'' 
intended thereby to so limit the liability of the de-
fendants, ' that said $2,000.00 ~and interest on 
$14,000.00 payable on February 1, 1939, should he 
paid at that time only in the event said amount was 
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realized as profits from the feeding of lan1hs, and 
erred in finding that the defendants fully perform-
ed their obligation under said contract by paying 
to the plaintiff the profits realized from said lamb 
feeding venture; and that the use of the words 
''more or le·ss'' following the agreement to pay 
$2,000.00 meant and was intended to mean th_at de-
fendants should pay and the plaintiff should ac-
cept the profits realized from said lamb feeding· 
venture; 
~f.'hat the test4TI-ony and evidence is insufficient to 
support said finding, and that there is no evidenee 
supporting or reasonably tending to support ·said 
findings; and that there is no substantial evidence 
showing or rea·sonably tending to show that by thP 
uee of the words ''more or less'' the parties in-
tended that the defendants should pay and the plain-
tiff should accept the profits realized from said 
\lamb feeding venture to apply upon said payment 
and interest, or that plaintiff would waive her 
.right to re-enter and take po·ssession of. said prem-
ises upon payment of said amount, and that the 
preponderance of the evidence is to the contrary. 
In Assignments of Error Nos. 3, 4 and 5 appel-
lant alleges error in· the conclusions of the court in 
respect to the same matters referred to in findings 
of fact Nos. 9 and 10, and that the conclusions and 
decree of the court are contrary to the findings of 
the court; _that it appears from the testimony with-
out dispute in said cause that the defendants were 
in default in the payment of interest and in the 
payment of taxes. The assignments of error fully 
set forth the insufficiency of the evidence to sus-
tain the findings; that the findings, conclusions and 
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11 
decree are contrary to the preponderance of the 
evidence and against law. 
Before discussing the assigned errors, it will 
uid to refer briefly to the testimony of the parties 
regarding the conversations and occurrences prior 
to and at the time the contract was prepared and 
signed. Mr. and :Mrs. Bastian testified as to the·se 
matters suhstantially as follows: That Mrs. Erick-
son mentioned selling the place to Bastian the day 
before the contract was signed (Tr. 51; Ab. 46); 
that ·she asked him if he wanted to buy the prop~ 
erty, and he told her he didn't have anything 
to buy with; that she would rather see him get the 
place and suggested that he try and get a govern-
ment loan; that she told him she wanted $14,000.00 
for the property; that he later told her he couldn't 
get the money; that she told him that Will Taylor 
in Fremont and another party wanted the place ; 
that a little later Mrs. Erickson sent for him; that he 
went to her home, and she said she had been thinking 
'it over and had decided to turn everything over to 
Bastian if he wanted it with the understanding 
that he would feed lambs; that she said whatever 
the lamb crop brings I want $1,000.00 or $2,000.00 
or whatever they bring and you are able to pay; 
that Bastian said, if you want to go down to the 
bank and fix it up to that effect, I will take a 
chance; that they went to the bank and had Mrs. 
Eckersley draw up the contract. ·When she drew 
up the contract, she wrote down $2,000.00; that 
Bastian mentioned that it was $2,000.00 more or 
less. (Tr. 52; Ab. 47). On cross examination Mr. Bas-
tian testified that Mrs. Erickson came down to his 
-place and put the proposition up to him and asked 
if he wanted to accept it and ·said she had decidea 
to let him have the place if he wanted it for 
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12 
$14,000.00 and provided that 'he feed lambs; that 
he remembered the provision in the_ contract about 
money beirtg due to the bank, and that he was to 
pay that money and deduct it from the $2,000.00 
payment; that he understood he was to pay Mrs 
Erickson what the lambs brought. ( Tr. 64-68 ; A b. 
51-52) ; that he told Mrs. Erickson he w()uldn 't sign 
any paper ·stipulating $2,000.00, but if she would 
put in $2,000.00 more or less, he would sign the 
contract. 
Mrs. Bastian testified that the first time ·she 
talked to Mrs. Erickson was when ·she called at thE.l 
Bastian residence in Loa; that this was on the ·same 
day the agreement was drawn up; that at that time 
1\f.rs. ·Erickson .wanted to ·sell her place and offered 
it lo the Bastians providing they would feed lamb~ 
and tqrn over what was made out of the lamh crop 
for the first payment; that the partie·s discussed 
the terms of the contract before they went to the 
bank; that she was present when the contract was 
signed; that at that time a·s nearly as she oould re-
call they 'agreed to pay "what the lamb crop 
brought" (Tr. 88; A b. 58) ; that she understood 
~1rs. ~rickson and ~1:r. Bastian had talked about 
the property before; that it was agreed $14,000.00 
shouldhe paid for the property; that she' offered it 
to Mr. and Mrs. Bastian, provided they would rais~ 
lamhs; that that was about the extent of the con-
versation; that feeding lambs had been one of the 
'm6·st profitable things for the farmers at Loa; 
' : .. ·' ' 
Th·at . the parties gave Mrs. Eckersley the . in-
formation about how much they were to pay, 
and she- wrote all the things down (Tr. 90-
.Hl; Ab. 59) ; that she· remembered they were 
-required to · pay $2,000.00, and . then 4 per-
cent interest oTI. the unpaid balance, and that they 
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were to pay the taxes for 1938; that after the con-
tract had been written up, there was a ·suggestion 
made to make it $2,000.00 ''more or less' '-because 
Mrs. Erickson wanted all that wa:s made out of the 
lamb's; that this was agreed upon; that she didn't 
know whether the suggestion was made by Mrs. 
Erickson or :Mr. Bastian (Tr. 92; Ab. 60); that 
\there was a discussion about the contract right 
ruter it was completed and they then decided it 
would not be a safe thing to write up a contract and 
sign it for $2,000.00 when they didn't know what a 
lamb crop would bring, but Mrs. Erickson said ·she 
wouldn't penalize the Bastians but _ would accept 
what the lambs brought; that they were willing to 
take all the chances and make it whatever they 
could; the only condition was, that if they did not 
quite make $2,000.00, they would still be able to go 
and try to work out; that is what Mrs. Erickson 
agreed to do; that they knew Mrs. Erickson had 
obligations (Tr. 89; Ab. 58-59). 
:Mrs. Erickson testified (Tr. 7-13; Ab. 33-35) 
that she had certain conversations with ~Ir. Bastian 
about his wanting to purchase the property; that 
they had a number of conversations for some period 
of time before the contract was signed. The first 
conversation was several days before the contract 
'was drawn up; that they talked about the place and 
the amount Bastian was to pay for it and the 
amount he should pay down and the payments he 
would make annually; that she went over the farm 
with him and looked at the crops; that they agreed 
on $14,000.00 for the property and Bastian said he 
could not make a down payment until he fed the 
crops to the lambs: that he intended to feed lambrs, 
and that he would pay $2,000.00 as first payment 
and intere'St on the balance of the principal at the 
rntr of 4 percent per annum, and that was agreed 
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upon; that Mrs. Erickson told him that he could 
11ot make it less than that amount if she were to 
meet her obligations; that she told him she was 
uwing the California Western States Life Insurance 
Company and wa:s owing $900.00 and interest to the 
State Bank of Wayne; that the obligation to the in-
:-::urance company was secured by the mortgage on 
1b~ farm and the bank s·ecured by a chattel mort-
gag·e on the personal property; that she told him 
she owed J. S. Peterson of Gunnison and George 
C. Brinkerhoff, and that these accounts must be 
paid out of the $2,000.00; that Bastian said he 
·wouldn't pay les·s than that; that he had a beautiful 
c1'op of potatoes and would pay $4,000.00 at least 
when the first payment was due and at all events 
·would pay $2,000.00 and interest so Mrs. Erickson 
could meet her obligations; that she turned every-
thing over to him including all of the crops just as 
they were on the 25th day of August; that ·she re-
membered the conversation about the words "more 
or less;'' that she asked the question what that 
more or less meant, and that Mr. Bastian said that 
it didn't mean anything only that if he did fall down 
for a few dollars that Mrs. Erickson would accept 
it; that he might be a few dollars less than hrs pay-
ment, and that Mrs. Erickson wouldn't take the 
'property back for this rea·son; that they indicated 
to Mrs. Eckersley what they had agreed upon and 
it was placed in the contract. 
Plaintiff's husband, L. H. Erickson. testified 
that he remembered the occasion when Mrs. Erick-
•son and Mr. Bastian were discussing the contract 
for the sale of Mrs. Erickson's farm to ~{r. Bas-
tian; that it was a day or two before the contract 
was signed; that they were sitting on the steps of 
the porch out from the kitchen facing south, that 
he· had been over doing the morning chores at the 
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corral and can1e oYer where they were; that as he 
came O\'er :Mr. Bastian said ~'I will pay the $2,000.00 
and interest on the principal,'' and he throwed hi',:) 
hands out to\nlrd the potato patch and said ''I be-
lieve I will be able to pay you $4,000.00 and inter-
est'' and then ~Irs. Erickson said "I \vill have to 
have $2,000.00 and intere·st on the principal;" that 
the next morning· he talked to Mr. Bastian and Bas-
tian said that Ivan (a son of Mrs. Erickson) wanted 
$1,000.00 of that money; that he then told Mrs. 
Erickson that he did not see how Ivan could ex-
pect that because it would take most of the money 
to help :Jirs. Erickson meet her obligations. (Tr. 
22-23; A b. 38). 
Jirs. Eckersley te·stified that she is the County 
Clerk of Wayne County; that she typed the agree-
ment at the request of Mrs. Erickson and Mr. Bas-
tian; that they came do·wn to her office and told her 
what they wanted in the agreement, and she wrote 
all thev told her· that she remembered some of the discus~ions that' were had at the time the words 
"more or le·ss" were placed in the agreement; that 
the agreement was \Yritten up complete with 
$2,000.00 put in it without the words ''more or less" 
before anything wa·s said about the. lamb crop. After 
it was written up and read over, the lamb crop was 
discussed and she was instructed to put in the words 
"more or less" right after the $2,000.00; that she 
took aU three copies of the agreement and put each 
copy in the machine and wrote in the words ''more 
or less'' after they had discussed the matter; that 
Mrs. Erickson said ''I do not want to he hard on 
you and will put more or less if what you make on 
the lamb crop doesn't quite reach the $2,000.00. '' 
(Tr. 80-81; Ab. 54-55). On cross examination Mrs. 
Erkersley again testified that Mrs. Erickson said 
flt n1~ time they were discussing the insertion of the 
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words "more or less'' in the contract, that if the 
lamb crop didn't come quite up to the $2,000.00, you 
will he protected, and that ·she didn't want any 
trouble over it; that they were the words she used, 
"if the lamb crop doesn't quite come up to 
$2,000.00; '' that they were discussing the po·ssibil-
ity that Bastian might not be able to make the en-
tire payment, and that is why the words ''more or 
les·s" were inserted. ( Tr. 82; _t\.b. 56 ; Tr. 84; A.b. 
57). 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT 
DEFENDANTS ·WERE NOT IN DEFAUI/1' 
BY FAILING TO PAY INTEREST AND 
TAXES. 
The foregoing testimony does not justify the 
findings, conclusions and decree of the court that 
there was no default on the part of the defendants in 
the performance of the contract or that the words 
"more or less"- were U'sed and intended to be used 
for the purpose of limiting the liability of the de-
fendants to pay only that sum which should be 
realized from the profits ari·sing from the feeding 
of lambs, and we submit that that preponderance 
of the evidence, when considered in connection with 
recognized rules of interpretatons, shows that the 
parties did not intend that the Bastians should be 
relea·sed from the payment of the $2,000.00 on con-
dition that they pay the profits from the lambs. 
The record is without dispute that they did not even 
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pay the profits from the lan1bs. This matter will 
be ·:mbsequently di~cussed. 
This being an equity case~ the court will go be· 
hind the findings and weigh all the evidence and 
tlecide the issues according to its preponderance. 
Corrstitution of Utah, Section 9, Article 8, 
Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, Section 
104-41-23. 
Holm v. Holm, 44 Utah 242; 139 Pac. 937. 
Utah Commercial Savings Bank v. Faux, 44 
Utah 323; 140 Pac. 660. 
Little Y. Stringfellow, 46 Utah 576; 151 
Pac. 347. 
North Point Consolidated Irrigation Co. v. 
Utah & S. L. Canal Co., 16 Utah 246; 
52 Pac. 168. 
vVarner v. Tyng Warehouse Co., 71 Utah 
303 ; 2'65 Pac. 7 48. 
McKellar R.eal Estate & Inv. Co. v. Paxton, 
62 Utah 97; 218 Pac. 128. 
The contract in this ca·se required the defend-
ants to pay to the plaintiff $2,000.00 more or less 
on February 1st, 1939 and to pay interest at 4 per-
cent per annum at the time of principal .Payments. 
It al·so required the defendants to pay all taxes and 
assessments against the land and water commencing 
with the year 1938. There is not a ·single word in 
:1nybody's testimony from. which the inference 
could be drawn that the defendants were to he re-
leased from the payment of interest on the prin· 
cipal sum if the profits fron1 the lambs were not 
sufficient to pay such interest. Neither Mr. or Mrs. 
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Bastian made any such claim, nor did they te·stify 
to any fact from which such an inference could be 
drawn. It is extremely difficult to understand how 
the court could make the finding ( Ab. 26) "That 
there was an understanding that if the defendants 
would feed lambs upon said property, the plaintiff 
would look to the net proceeds from the ·sale of said 
Lambs ... for the payment of interest at the rate of 4 
percent per annum upon the sum of $14,000.00, pay-
able February 1, 1939," or the finding that if the 
profits from the lambs was insufficient to pay said 
interest, the defendants would be relieved from 
such payment or that the plaintiff assumed the 
whole risk that the lamb proceeds would be suffi-
cient to pay ·such interest or that by reason of any 
conversations or occurrences the plaintiff waived 
her right to re-enter and take possession because 
of the failure to pay such interest. To make a 
finding of fact not supported by any te·stimony 
whatsoever, and upon such fact base a conclusion of 
law and decree, is in effect to make a new contract 
and impair the obligation of the contract. Certainly 
no claim will be made, ba:sed upon any fa.ct in evi-
dence in this case, that there is any testimony from 
which any inference can be drawn that the defend-
ants' obligation to pay interest on the principa1 
sum wa:s contingent in the slightest extent upon the 
profits from the feeding of lamb's. 
Another proposition equally uncontroverted is 
the obligation imposed upon -the defendants to pay 
the taxe·s upon the land and water for the year 1938. 
(Ab. 29-30). The conclusion of the court that the 
defendants were not in default by reason of t~eir 
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failure to pay taxes on said property for the year 
1938 is contrary to the undisputed evidence. 
The court made a finding (No. 6; Ab. 20) that 
the defendants did not pay the interest, or any part 
thereof, upon the sum of $14,000.00 or upon any 
other sum and haYe paid no interest whatsoever, 
and that the de-fendants failed and neglec.ted to pay 
the taxes upon said property for the year 1938. Not-
withstanding such fact, the court concludes (Con-
clusion No.1; A_b .. 29) that the defendants were not 
in default by reason of their failure to pay taxes 
for the reason that no definite time was specified 
for the payment of said taxes and conclude·s in the 
same paragraph that the payment of interest was 
contingent upon the succes·s of Bastian's lamb-
feeding venture. There is not a word of testimony 
in support of either of these conclusions, the same 
are not only contrary to the evidence, but are not 
permissible under the findings. These matters 
seem so fundamental from any view of the record 
that further argument or citation of authorities 
would ·seem wholly unnecessary. It is certainly a 
fair construction of this or any contract that where 
one of the parties agrees to pay taxes for a certain 
year, it means that the taxes shall be paid in that 
year or at least shall be paid before the: property is 
sold for non-payment. If there was any intention 
to the contrary, certainly it doe·s not appear of rec-
ord in this case. 
We submit that the court has improperly con-
F-trued the contract and failed to give any effecf to 
1the evidence or findings in concluding that there 
was no default by rea·son of the failure to pay in-· 
trrest and taxes. 
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rrHE COURT HAS IMPROPERLY CONSTRUED 
THEi ,CONTRACT WITH RE8PECT TO 
THE USE OF THE WORDS ''1\IOBJE OR 
LESS'' 
The evidenee shows without conflict that when 
the parties talked to Mrs. Eckersley about the 
agreement, neither Mr. or Mrs. Bastian made any 
statement that the February 1st payment was to be 
in any way contingent upon profits from feeding 
lamb's. Mrs. Eckersley testified that the parties 
spent about 15 minutes explaining to her what they 
had agreed upon. She then reduced to writing 
what they told her. Neither Mr. and :Mrs. Bastian 
said anything to l\1rs. Eckersley about the $2,000.00 
payment being conting~ent upon lamb profits. If 
there was any contingency about the payment of 
the $2,000.00 or if tliere had been any agreement of 
that kind, certainly JVIr. and Mrs. Bastian would 
.have said something about it to Mrs. Eckersley. It 
is a good criterion by which to determine what 
·occurred before. No suggestion wa:s made as to any 
contingency until after the contract had been pre-
pared and the paper~ removed from the type-
writer. Then for the first time it was mentioned 
by Mr. Bastian (Tr. 52; Ab. 47) that the payment 
might be les·s than $2,000.00. The testimony of 
~Irs. Eckersley ·supports almost without qualifica-
tion what Mrs. Erickson said was the substance of 
the conversations before the contract was prepared, 
and what occurred after the contract had been pre-
pared and the words ''more or less'' added thereto. 
Mrs. Eckersley said that Mr. and Mrs. Ba:stian and 
1\f rs. Erickson had be~n discussing the agreement 
while she was writing it, but after the discus·sion, 
Mrs. Erickson said that she didn't want to be hard 
on Bastian and would be willing to put in the words 
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''mor.e or l~ss'' if what he n1ade on the lamb crop 
~lid not quite reach the $2,000.00. Thi·s w·as ~gain 
testified to by 1\lt·s. Eckersley on direct examina-
tion when she "Tas called as a witnes·s for the de-
fendant and again on cross examination she an-
swered: 
Q. All you remember wa·s they were dis-
cussing by themselves about lambs fed on 
the property 1 · · 
A. Yes, and the pos·sibility that he mig~t 
not be able to make the entire payme:o.t, and 
that is why the words "more or less" were 
inserted. 
There is nothing to indicate that the parties in-
tended by \Yhat was said arid done to use the e:xpres'-
sion "more or less" in any other than its·l>rdinary 
meaning. There is nothing which would justify the 
c.ourt in giving to the expression a different kind ·of 
meaning. The words "more or less" have a rather 
well accepted meaning in law. The phrase -is or-
dinarily used as qualifying the· exact" n-umber of 
acres in a piece of land, and the definition of·· the 
phrase as thus used is considered as··covering incon-
siderable or small differences one way or .. the other. 
The fact that the expression here refers· to rrioney 
would in no way change the meaning of the terin. 
It'S application is discussed in · 
Volume 27, R.C.L. Under Title of Vender 
and Purchaser, Section 152, ~s f()lJ.o.ws: 
"It iR the general view that this phrase, 
or others of like import, added to a state-, · 
ment of quantity can only be considered ·a,s ;,. : : 
covering inconsiderable or small differ-·· 
ences one way or the other and do not in 
themselve·s determine the character of the 
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sale as one in gross or by the acre. As has 
been said the plain and sensible rule is that 
when land is sold by the acre as containing 
so many acres, 'more or less,' if the quan-
tity on an actual ·survey and estimation, 
either overrunning or falling short of the 
contents named, be small, no compensation 
should be recovered by either party. The 
words 'more or les·s' must be intended to 
meet such a result. But if the variance be 
considerable, the party sustaining the lo·ss 
should he allowed for it." 
It is further indica ted in this section that the 
same ~ffect is to be given to the qualification of 
the statement of the quantity by such phrases as 
'by egtimation' or 'about,' and that the use of such 
expressions doe·s not show an absolute contract of 
hazard was intended by the parties so as to deny 
the right to equitable relief. In 
41 c. J., page 214, the term rs defined as 
follows: 
"Generally in its plain and most obvious 
meaning an expression which shows that 
the parties were to run the risk of gain or 
loss a·s there might happen to be an excess 
or deficiency iin the estimated quantity; 
words of safety and precaution and in-
tended to cover some slight or unim-
portant inaccuracy; words used in con-
tracts or conveyances to qualify the rep-
resentation of quality in such a manner 
that, if made in good faith, neither party 
should be entitled to any relief on ac-
count of deficiency or surplus.'' See Oakes 
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v. DeLancy, 30 N .E. 97-±. Also \Vilson v. 
Rafter, 17-± S.\V. 137. 
There are cases which such terms a:s 
'about' and 'more or less' when used in 
contracts to qualify the stated quantity or 
number are given the meaning of an 
approximation with the stated quantity 
or number as a fixed basis for such appTox-
i·mation and there are other cases in which 
·such terms are treated as a mere estimate 
of an unknown and indefinite quantity or 
number which the parties have agreed shall 
be the subject matter of the. contract. Each 
definition may be soundly applied according 
to the intention of the parties which must 
be ascertained from all terms of the con-
tract. See :Mosby v. Smith, 186 S. W. 49. '' 
We have been unable to find a case where the 
IJhrase has been applied following an agreernent to 
pay a sum of money but the use of the phrase under 
varying situations is discussed in 
27 A. L. R. 134, Subdivision 5. 
7 A.L.R., page 5, and 
70 A.L.R. 368. 
No inference, we think, can reasonably be drawn 
that the parties intended the words ''more or le~·s'' 
be given a construction other than their usual and 
ordinary meaning and certainly it can not be~ 
assumed from any te-stimony in this record· that e1e: 
parties intended anything different than v;·hat this 
language implies. This Court held in the case of 
Board of Education v. ·Wright-Osborn(:-. 
Co., 49 U. 453; 164 Pac. 1033, 
that all the words used in a contract ·must, if pos-
sible. be given their usual and ordinary meaning 
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and effect, and that it will not be aS'sumed that 
l'arties to contracts did not intend what their lan-
guage implies. 
And in the case of 
Cmnmings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157; 129 
Pac. 619, the Court ·said: 
''In determining the meaning that should 
be given to language used in an agreement 
in order to ascertain the intention of the 
parties, all the words or terms used must 
be given their ordinary and usual effect, 
when considered in the light of the subject-
matter and the nature of the agreement.'' 
In the ca-se of 
Allen v. Bissinger, 62 Utah 226; 219 Pac. 
539, 
the Court quotes with approval the following lan-
guage from 
13 C.J. 265: 
"The apparent mutual assent of the par-
ties, es·sential to the formation of a con-
tract~ must be gathered from the language 
employed by them, and the law imputes to 
a person an intention corresponding to the 
reasonable meaning of its words and acts. 
It judges of his intentions by his outward 
expressions and excludes all questions in 
regard to his unexpressed intention. If 
his words or acts, judged by a rea·sonahle 
standard, manifest an intention to agree 
to the matter in question, that aggreement 
is establi·shed, and it is immaterial what 
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his mind upon the subject.'' 
In the case of 
Murphy v. Salt Lake City, 65 Utah 295; 
236 Pac. 680, the Court said: 
''Contracts are prepared and entered into 
for the convenience and protection of the 
parties, and unless waived the courts are 
bound to enforce them in accordance with 
the intention as the ·same is manifested by 
the language used by the parties to the 
contract.'' 
To the same effect see 
12 A. J ur., Title Contracts, page 768, Sec-
tion 236: 
"Words will be given their ordinary mean-
ing when nothing appears to show that 
they are used in a different sense and no 
unreasonable or absurd consequences will 
result from doing so. Words cho·sen by 
the contracting parties should not be un-
naturally forced beyond their ordinary 
meaning or given a curious, hidden sense 
which nothing but the exigency of a hard 
case and the ingenuity of a trained and 
acute mind can discover.'' 
THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND JUDG-
MENT ARE CONTRARY TO THE EVI-
DENCE AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE 
CONTRACT. 
We respectfully submit that within recognized 
ro]es of construction the contract is neither am-
biguou~ or uncertain. However, no objection was 
interposed to the introduction of parol testimony 
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t('nding to show the occurences prior to the ex~ 
ecution of the contract. The plaintiff first testified 
with respect to these occurrences, and no complaint 
could now be made that error was committed by the 
court in permitting such testimony. It i·s con-
tended, however, that ·such oral testimony does not 
show an intention to pay any considerable sum less 
than $2,000.00) las the February 1, 1939 payment. 
Respondents do not contend, or at least no conten-
tion was made at trial or in the pleadings, that the 
:contract was in any way modified. Their claim 
is that they have performed the contract, not be-
cause of actual payment, not because of any modi-
illication of the contract, but because of the con-
struction that respondents contend should be given 
to the contract and the use of the words ''more or 
les·s.'' ·we think the testimony shows without serL 
ous conflict that there was no conversation or occur-
rence which justifies respondents' contention 
in this regard. The testimony oi the plaintiff and 
the defendants as to what occurred prior to the time 
of the preparation o£ the contract may have been 
colored. We must have in mind their interest in the 
outcome of the litigation. A good yardstick by 
:which to test the testimony of either party as to 
what occurred before they reached the office of 
Mrs. Eckersley is what they told her to place in the 
e;ontract. The entire agreement wa·s discussed and 
prE:pared without a word being said by either of the 
defendants that the obligation to pay $2',000.00 on 
February 1, 1939, was in any way contingent upon 
the ability of Mr. Ba·stian to make profits from 
feeding lambs. If there had been such conversa-
tions or occurrences as were testified to by Mr. and 
(~frs. Bastian, certainly in the course of ordinary 
human events, the Ba·stians would have said some-
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thing about it, and there would, at that time, have 
been included in the contract some limitation upon 
that liability or son1e intin1ation that the payment 
of said amount was contingent. There was nothing 
said concerning ·such contingency, nor was anything 
added to the contract after it had been prepared 
whieh created such contingency. 
The testimony of nlrs. Eckersley fully ·supports 
the testimony of ~Irs. Erickson that the only COll-
tingency of any kind was the po·ssibility that M.r. 
Bastian's lamb profits might leave him short a small 
~mount in discharging the entire $2,000.00 obliga-
tion and only in thi·s event, could Bastian avoid a 
default. 
If we are to go beyond the terms of the con"'" 
'tract, and construe it in the light of the testimony 
without giving effect to the foregoing rule of con-
struction, we submit that there can be little question 
as to the actual intention of the parties. It would 
be repetitious again to call the Court's attention to 
the testimony of the various witnesses and what 
occurred prior to and at the time of the making and 
execution of the contract. We submit that this tes-
timony clearly ·shows that the parties intended to 
excuse the defendants only in the event that thb 
amount paid on February 1, 1939, or within the 
grace period of the contract, should be a ·sum only 
slightly less than the required payment of $2,000.00. 
In construing the contract resort must he had 
not only to the testimony but to all the provisions 
of the agreement. The seventh paragraph of the 
contract provides that the defendants shall be al-
lowed thirty days grace in making the payments 
in the event their lamb crop or other crops can not 
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be disposed of by February 1st of each year. This 
grace period was for the benefit and protection of 
the defendants, not that they might pay less than 
$~,000.00, but that they would be protected in the 
payment of ths amount later than February 1st if 
their lamb crop or other crops had not been dis-
posed of. There is no intimation in this paragraph, 
placed therein for the benefit of the defendants, that 
it the profits from the lambs did not equal or ex-
oeed a sum ·sufficient to pay $2,000.00, that they 
would be relieved from payment at that time. If 
there had been any such intention, or if in the use of 
the words ''more or less'' the parties had in mind 
what the defendants now claim, certainly something 
would have been said about it in thi·s provision of 
tlje contract. It is significant that when this pro-
vision of the contract was prepared, no conclusion 
had been reached by Mr. Bastian whether he would 
or would not feed lambs, and he was free to dispose 
of the crop on the farm in any way that he might 
choose, but if he had not disposed of it by February 
1st, he wa·s then granted an additional grace period 
of thirty days before he would be in default. 
It also clearly appears that the defendants were 
fully advised concerning the obligatioll's of Mrs. 
Erickson. Her testimony is to the effect that she 
fully advised the defendant·s as to the various obli-
gations that she was owing, and that she would be 
unable to meet these obligations unless the full 
su1n of $2,000.00 was paid. The defendants admit 
that they knew of her obligation on the first mort-
gage held by the California We·stern States Life 
Insurance Company; that they knew of her obliga-
tion to the State Bank of ·Wayne for $900.00, and.in 
view of this situation the parties provided in par-
agraph 11 of the contract that the defendants would 
pay this obligation and deduct the an1ount of ·such 
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payment from the $2,000.00 due on February 1st 
and then provided specifically ''payment to bank to 
be made out of the 1938 crop on land." There is 
no ambiguity or uncertainty in this provision of 
the contract; no construction of its terms is neces-
sary. It clearly appears that the parties intended 
that the crops on the farm would be used to pay the 
February payment of $2,000,00. 
Mrs. Erickson was to be- protected by such 
application of the crops and no obligation was im-
posed upon the defendants to feed the crop to 
lambs. ~Irs. Erickson would naturally want some 
protection a·~ to the value of the crops already pro-
duced, and nlr. Bastian would ordinarily have no 
objection to a provision so manifestly fair. Crops 
had been produced upon the property of the rea-
sonable market value at the time po·ssession was de-
livered to the defendants in the amount of $1500:00, 
and certainly l\1:rs. Erickson would insist upon a 
payment of that amount plus some additional sum 
to cover the use and occupation of her new modern 
five-room home, the value of the use of· the personal 
property and the reasonable value of the market-
able livestock. We ·submit that it is an inconsist-
ent construction to say as the court found in find-
ing No. 9: 
''That the plaintiff assumed the whole 
risk that the lamb proceeds would pay the 
full amount of $2,000.00 and interest, and 
in the event that the profits from the feed-
ing of lambs wa~s insufficient to pay said 
sum of $2,000.00 and interest, the plaintiff 
agreed to and did waive her right to re-
enter and take posseS'sion of said prop~ 
erty." 
Such finding we submit is not only contrary to 
the exprP.s·s provisions of the contract, but is con-
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trary to the great preponderance of the evidence 
when viewed in the light of the circumstances un-
der which the contract was made. We ask-what 
fact is there in thi·s case on which the oourt could 
find an intention on the part of either of the par-
ties that the defendants should sell or feed all of 
the crops, ·should have the benefit and comfort of 
the plaiJ!tiff 's home; use all the personal property, 
have the income of the milk cows, market the hogs, 
dnd otherwise enjoy the benefits of other property 
delivered by plaintiff to the defendants, and when 
called upon to answer to the performance of the 
agreement, be excused therefrom by the simple 
a·ssertion that in the use of the words "more or 
~ess,'' the parties intended that the plaintiff should 
Emffer the entire los·s and assume all the risks and 
hazards of a venture to be conducted by the defend. 
ants and over which the plaintiff had no control. 
The decision in this ca·se has not only deprived 
the plaintiff of her crops and her property for the 
Pntire year of 1939, hut it has deprived her of the 
crops and the use of her property for the year 1940. 
She ha·s been placed in a position as shown by cbe 
exhibits in this case (Exhibit C; Tr. 130-132) where 
the first mortgage on her property has become de-
linquent a~1d attorneys employed to foreclO'se said 
mortgage, and she has yet an obligation to Mr. 
Brinkerhoff upon which a foreclosure was pending 
at the time of the trial of this action. (RJeporter'·s 
Tr. 20). 
This Court in the case of 
Burt v. Stringfellow, 45 Utah 207; 143 Pac. 
234, 
eonsidered and construed an option to purchase 
land and had occa·sion to lay down certain cardinal 
rules in the construction of contracts where because 
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of ambiguity or uncertainty resort was had to parol 
testimony. It was held that where the language of 
a contract is ciear and all of its terms are explicH 
and certain, it is not open to construction; that all 
~f the words and expre'Ssions used by the parties 
IliUSt be given full force and effect, unless to do so 
leads to an absurdity or is contrary to the man-
ifest purpose or intention of the parties; that the 
intention of the parties must be determined from 
the language used when applied to the subject-
matter and the surrounding circumstances and con-
ditions. 
And in the case of 
Caine v. Hagenbarth, 37 Utah 69; 106 Pac. 
945, 
where the Court construed an option to purcha-se 
a copper mine, the Court held that where the ex-
act meaning of a written contract is in doubt, as 
where the language used is contradictory and ob-
scure, and there are two interpretations possible, 
one of which establrshes a comparative1y equitable 
contract and the other, an unconscionable one, tne 
former should prevail. 
Makris v. Malis, 50 Utah 544; 167 Pac. 
802. 
The Court in this ca·se construed a contract for tha 
sale of shares of stock in a corporation and held 
that in construing a written contract it i·s the duty 
'of the court to consider all the terms and the re-
rJationship of the parties existing at the time the 
concontract was made, and if possible, to arrive at 
their intent. And in 
Penn Star Mining Co. v. Lyman, 64 Utah 
343; 231 Pac. 107, 
the Court considers at length rules of interpreta-
tion to be applied in determining the intention of 
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the parties to written contracts. The Court quotes 
with approval from the case of 
Salt Lake City v. Smith, 104 Fed. 462, 
where the following language was used by the 
Court: 
''The purpo·se of a written contract is to 
evidence the terms on which the minds of 
the parties to it met when they made it, and 
the ascertainment of those terms, and the 
·sense in which the parties to the agree-
ment used them when they agreed to them 
is the great desideratu1n and the true end 
of all contractual interpretation. The ex-
press terms of an agreement may not be 
abrogated, nullified, or modified by parol 
te·stimony; but, when their construction or 
extent is in question, the meaning of the 
terms upon which the minds of the parties 
met when they settled them, and their 
intention in using them, must he ascer-
tained, and, when ascertained/ they must 
prevail in the interpretation of .the agree-
ment, however broad or narrow the words 
in which they are expressed. In the dis-
covery of this meaning, the intention, the 
situation of the parties, and facts and cir-
cumstances which surrounded and necessar-
ily influenced them when they made their 
contract, the reasonableness of the re-
·spective claims under it, and, above all, 
the subject-matter of the agreement and 
the purpose of its execution, are always 
conducive to, and often as es·sential and 
controlling- in, the true interpretation of 
the contract as the mere word~ of its vari-
ous ·stipulationR. These are rules for the 
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construction of contracts 'rhich commend 
themselves to the reason and are estab-
lished by repeated decisions of the court's, 
and they n1ust not be permitted to escape 
attention in the consideration of the con-
tract which this case presents. Accum-
ulator Co. v. Dubuque St. Ry. Co., 64 F. 
70, 74; 12 C.C.A. 37, 41, 42; 27 U.S. App. 
364, 372. '' 
The Court in this case held that extrinsic evidence 
may not be admitted to affect, vary, add to, or 
modify written instrument, but is admis·sible to 
show the true intention of parties, if the languagE\ 
of the instrument is obscure, uncertain or am-
biguous; and that unless provisions of a contract 
are clearly independent, distinct and ·severable, all 
terms and provisions must be construed together. 
PL.Al_:NTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO REPOSSESS 
FOR DEFENDANTS' DEFAULT. 
The contract contains the following provision: 
"In the event that the parties of the sec-
ond part shall default in the payment of 
either principal or interest as above out-
lined, the first party ·shall have the right 
to re-enter and take peaceable possession 
of said land and improvement's, and of 
this agreement and the warranty deed and 
all other papers pertaining to this agree-
ment." 
Respondents have made no claim that appel-
lant wa·s not entitled to repossess if they were in 
dPfault. Their answer (Ab. 11) admits the con-
tntet as pleaded but ''deny that they have violated 
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any of the covenants in said agreement and contend 
that they have paid according to the terms of the 
agreement and that they are not in default in the 
performance of any of the terms of said contract," 
1t.md allege that the plaintiff herself has violated the 
terms of the agreement, and set forth in paragraph 
6 a claimed specific violation of the agreement in 
t.llat ·Mrs. Erickson gave a mortgage to J. S. Peter-
son to secure the payment of an obligation for 
$231.61. (Ab. 26). They deny that the respondents' 
.Jecupation of the premises h; wrongful or unlawful 
or contrary to the terms of the agreement. We can 
-3ee no issue upon the right of the plaintiff to re-
pO'ssess if it is determined that plaintiff was en-
titled to the $2,000.00 payment on February 1, 
1939, or· substantially that amount less, of course, 
the sum of $900.00 paid by the defendant·s on be-
half of the plaintiff to the State Bank of Wayne. 
The amount of the default on March 1, 1939, was 
the balance of the $2,000.00 amounting to $1,100.00, 
interest on $14,000.00 amounting to $280.00: and 
taxe·s. vVhen the amount of the default is con-
sidered in connection with the value of crops and 
other property delivered to the defendants, re-
possession would certainly not be inequitable, and 
would not amount to the imposition of a penalty. 
'l'he pure and simple issue, therefore, is perform~ 
ance v. non-performance. The right of the plain-
Hff to declare a forfeiture and to reposse·ss is 
established by the decision of thi-s Court in the case 
of 
Imlay v. Bubier, 77 Utah 547; 298 Pac. 
383. 
Whatever uncertainty existed in this State arising 
out of prior decisions, was settled by the Imlay-
Buhler case. The plaintiff there brought his action 
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to reco,'er for the unpaid purchase price of real 
estate. There was a provision in the contract as 
follows: 
But in case default be made in said pay-
ments or either of them or the taxe·s should 
not have been paid each year by the sec-
ond party on the land and water rights 
herein de-scribed, then this contract shall 
become null and void and the rights and 
interests of said purchaser shall be de-
clared forfeited and the party of the first 
part shall have the right to re-enter and 
take possession of said property without 
recourse to law. 
The Court distinguishes the Cooley, Garn and Rich-
ards cases, _refers to the leading ca:se of Wilcoxson 
v. Stitt, which holds that such provisions are for 
the benefit of the vendor and concludes this phase 
of the decision in the following language: 
"It further rs to be noted that in both the 
Rose and Cooley cases this Court recog-
nized and approved the well-settled doc-
trine that as a general proposition forfeit-
ure clauses of contracts of the character 
considered by this Court are for the ben-
efit of the vendor and not of the vendee, 
and that, on default of payments and non-
complianc~ with the terms of the contract 
by the vendee, the vendor ordinarily has a 
choice of several remedies. He at hi·s elec-
tion may (1) specifically enforce the con-
tract, or (2') sue at law to recover the pur-
chase price remaining due, or (3) re-enter 
and take posse·ssion of the lands and re-
cover damages for the breach of contract. 
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The contract here was not a mere option 
to purchase. It was one where the plain-
tiff agreed to sell and the defendant to 
purcha:se the real estate and water right 
at an agreed price which the defendant 
promised and agreed to pay as by the terms 
of the contract provided, and where he as 
well as the plaintiff was required to per-
form the covenants and conditions respect-
ively imposed on each and as by the terms 
of the contract provided. We thus are of 
the opinion that the plaintiff had the right 
to maintain the action and to enforce the 
contract as was done, and that the demur-
rers were properly overruled; and, inas-
much as the defendant by his answer ad-
mitted the execution of the contract and 
expressly admitted that he had failed to 
make the payments as alleged in the com-
plaint and a:s provided by the contract, 
judgment on the pleadings, was properly 
granted." 
Nor is there any merit in the defense that 
r.Iaintiff violated her contract by giving a mort-
gage to J. S. Peterson. The obligation due to J. S. 
Peterson w~s one of the account·s that Mrs. Erick-
son told Mr. Bastian must be paid out the $2,000.00. 
J. S. Peterson had a judgment against Mrs. Erick-
fOn and had a writ of garnishment issued and 
served upon the defendant Ba:stian. By this writ 
the ~astians were required not to pay money due 
and owing to Mrs. Erickson. In order to release 
this writ of garnishment and to satisfy the claim 
of Mr. Peterson, the plaintiff gave Mr. Peterson a 
mortgage and procured a release of the writ of 
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garnishment. This release garnishment was 'Served 
on the defendants on April 3, 1939, (Ab. 5). 
The rule of law relating to incumbrances on 
land sold by a vendor is stated in 
Sections 437-438, 66 C. J., Title Vend or 
an4 Purchaser, as follows: 
''Generally, however, to justify rescission 
on the ground of encumbrances, it must 
appear that the vendee contracted for a 
title free of encumbrances ; that he neither 
knew or was chargeable with knowledge 
of the encumbrance; that the alleged en-
cumbrance is ·so in fact, is valid and legal, 
that it cannot be removed before the ven-
dor is bound to convey, or before the offer 
of the purchaser to rescind, or has not been 
removed before decree in the suit to re-
scind, and that the vendor would not have 
removed it if the purchaser had been will-
ing to complete the contract. The mere ex-
istence of a mortgage does not justify re-
scission of an installment contract where 
provision is made for discharge of the 
mortgage when the time for completion of 
the contract arrives, nor may the pur-
cha·ser rescind where the charge on the 
property is less than the unpaid purchase 
money and may be set up as a defense pro 
tanto in an action to recover therefor.'' 
Section 438. Rule in United State·s. 
''The American decisions have uniformly 
held that the vendor cannot he placed in 
default for defect of title or inability to· 
convey, by tender of performance by the 
purchaser and demand for performance by 
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the vendor before the expiration of the 
time fixed by the contract for ~airing a. 
conveyance, unless the nature of the defect 
is such that the vendor cannot acquire 
title.'' 
DEFENDAN'rS WERE IN DEFAULT ON 
THEIR OWN THEORY. 
The terstimony of Arthur Brian, cashier of the 
State Bank of Wayne ( Tr. 9:5-102; A b. 61-62;; Tr. 
115-118; Ah. 67-68), shows that Bastian received 
from the sale of lambs $373.6.04; that he paid out 
the following items: Purchase price of lamb.~, 
$1900.00; feed advances, $463.00. Total $2363.00; 
that he paid to the hank on behalf qf Mrs. Erick-
son, $900.00 principal, $53.91 interest; total ex-
penditures $3316.91, leaving a profit growing out 
of the lamb-feeding venture of $419.13. It wa:3 
further claimed, however, that Bastian paid 25c per 
head for freight o·n the lambs which was not paid 
by or through the bank. No showing was made, 
however, a.s to how many head of lambs were 
shipped, but there were 500 originally purchased. 
( 1,r. 59 ; A h. 49). On the assumption that as many 
were shipped out as were originally bought., the 
freight would not exceed $125.00, so that it is man-
ifestly apparent that Bastian did not even pay to 
Mrs. Erickson the amount realized as profits. How-
lver, Mr. Bastian claimed that he had paid some 
of :.Mrs. Erickson's hills and upon payment de-
posited the receipts with Mrs. Eckersley as escrow 
l1older. Therse bills were stipulated (Reporter's 
Tr. 5; Ab. 32) as follows: 
Charles Taylor, $40.00 which Taylor claimed 
1vas due from Mrs. Erickson for cutting grain be-
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fore Bastian took pm:;~e~siou of the property; $10.20 
for a blacks1nith bill claimed to be due fron1 l\'lrs . 
.bJrickson to ~lyron Guyn1on; $4.50 for a clahn of 
hack asses·s1nents on water tap; and $UJ.OO on an 
alleged old account of the People'~ Light & Power 
Company. The total of these bills anwunts to 
$73.70, ·still leaving· a profit not paid to ~lrs. Erick-
son of $220.43. There was no authority for Mr. 
Bastian to pay any accounts of Mrs. Erickson and 
he would not be entitled to any credit for so doing. 
\Ye submit that the record i·s without any substan-
tial dispute that the defendants did not even com-
ply with what they clain1ed their agreement was, 
and that the finding of the court to the effect tha.t 
the defendants had paid to the plaintiff all of thf 
profits ari~ing from the feeding of lambs is not 
supported by the evidence and in fact is contrary 
to the undisputed evidence. 
We respectfully submit that the contract in 
this case has been improperly construed; that a 
very ·serious injustice has resulted to the appel-
lant. The facts show a very great and unjust en-
richment of the respondents at the expense of the 
appellant; that the judgment should be reversed 
with directions to the District Court of W avne 
County to enter a decree for the repossession. of 
all of the appellant's property and a forfeiture of 
all of the rights of respondents under the contract 
of purchase and an accounting by the respondentS\ 
for all of the crops produced in the year 1940. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. H. HOUGAARD, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Appellant. 
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